III. Problems in Defending a Drug Case by Melangton, Philip R., Jr.
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 8 
Number 3 Spring 1974 pp.615-639 
Spring 1974 
III. Problems in Defending a Drug Case 
Philip R. Melangton Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Philip R. Melangton Jr., III. Problems in Defending a Drug Case, 8 Val. U. L. Rev. 615 (1974). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss3/4 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open 
access by the Valparaiso University Law School at 
ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Valparaiso University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, 
please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at 
scholar@valpo.edu. 
III. PROBLEMS IN DEFENDING A DRUG CASE
PHILIP R. MELANGTON, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
A few years ago, defending narcotic cases was something few
lawyers would undertake. The stigma inherent in a clientele of dope
pushers and addicts was certainly looked upon with disfavor by
many in the profession. Today, it is quite different; the drug prob-
lem now cuts through every social and economic strata: The major-
ity of drug and narcotic arrests and prosecutions today do not in-
volve the commercial pusher or distributor of hard core narcotics.
Rather, many of those involved are high school and college students,
the sons and daughters of bank presidents, executives, business-
men, professional people and individuals of every other economic
level from ghetto to high society.
Because of the enormity of the drug problem in the United
States today, and because of the hue and cry of law and order
zealots, there is a prevailing attitude that in dealing with the prob-
lem the end justifies the means.' This attitude is rampant not only
with respect to the all too infrequent detection, apprehension and
prosecution of top echelon distributors, but also to the millions of
youngsters involved in the drug scene.
As a result, law enforcement officers at all levels resort to meth-
ods which in any other area would be considered reprehensible.
There is more illegal searching, more entrapment and more police
perjury here than in any other field.' Because of the heralded drug
problem, these tactics are excused by Machiavellian judges both at
the trial and appellate levels. Therefore, as more and more people
are prosecuted for narcotic and drug violations, more and more legal
practitioners are called upon to appear as defense counsel and to
* Former First Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of Indiana; former
l)clput I Prosecutor, Marion County, Indiana; former Public Defender, Marion County Crimi-
nal Court: Chairman, Committee on Legislation and Revision of the State Criminal Code,
Indiana State Bar Association.
1. See Lindesmith, The Narcotic Lobby and the Drug Problem, 8 VAL. L. REv. 591
(1974).
2. See. e.g., Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Man-
hattan Police Practices 1960-1,962, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 549 (1962); D. BERNHEIM, DEFENSE OF
NARCOTIC CASES, § 3.11 (1973).
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understand the practical problems peculiar to drug related cases. It
is the purpose of this article to point out these problems and to point
out the legal difficulties the practitioner may encounter in a drug
defense case.
TRAFFIC AND POSSESSION: PENALTIES
Criminal penalties relating to drugs and narcotics are found in
both our federal and state laws. Whether a person, at a given time,
is prosecuted in federal or state court depends primarily upon who
made the arrests since both federal and state laws are normally
violated at the same time. Whether one can be prosecuted at both
levels remains to be seen.' Federal and state laws proscribe generally
the same conduct and concern the same drugs; only the penalties
differ.
Indiana and Federal Provisions Compared
In Indiana, the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act4 was enacted in
1935. It remained without change until the penalties were increased
both in 1957 and in 1961.1 Also in 1961, there was added the Indiana
Dangerous Drug Act.' In 1971, marihuana was deleted from the
definition of "narcotic drugs" in the Narcotic Act and added to the
definition of "dangerous drugs" in the Drug Act.' This had the effect
of reducing the possible penalty for marihuana offenses. As a nar-
3. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922), for the proposition that double jeopardy
is not involved when there is joint federal and state jurisdiction. But see Ashe v. Swensen,
397 U.S. 436 (1970); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969), wherein most of these legal foundations were destroyed.
4. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3519 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-24-1-1 (1971) (re-
pealed effective Oct. 1, 1973) [hereinafter cited in text as Narcotic Act].
5. The 1957 amendment raised the penalty for any unauthorized possession of a nar-
cotic drug from a tine of up to $100.00 and imprisonment for not less than 60 nor more than
100t days, to a fine of up to $1,000.00 and imprisonment of not less than one year nor more
than two years. The 1961 amendment created the offense of possession with intent to sell with
a penalty otnot less than 5 nor more than 20years with a fine of up to $2,000.00; it also raised
the penalty for sale from 2 to 5 years to 5 to 20 years and increased the maximum fine from
$l1.000 to $2,000. In 1961, the penalty for simple (unauthorized) possession was raised to not
less than 2 nor more than 10 years.
6. IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-3331 (1969), IND. CODE § 16-6-8-1 (1971) [hereinafter cited in
text as Drug Acti.
7. In People v. McCabe, 49 Ill.2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971), the Supreme Court of
Illinois held that the classification of marihuana with narcotics for the purpose of penalty was
an unconstitutional violation of equal protection.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [1974], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss3/4
DRUG DEFENSE
cotic, penalties had ranged from an indeterminate sentence of from
5 to 20 years for a first offense or 20 years to life for a subsequent
offense of selling or, possessing with intent to sell, to a penalty of 2
to 10 years for a first offense or 5 to 20 years for a subsequent offense
of simple possession.' Defined as a "dangerous drug" rather than a
"narcotic drug," the penalty for possession or sale of marihuana
became from 1 to 10 years for a first offense and 2 to 15 years for a
subsequent offense.' If, however, the first offense involves simple
possession of any dangerous drug (with the exception of possession
of more than 25 grams of marihuana or more than 5 grams of hash-
ish), the court may impose a determinate sentence of not less than
thirty days nor more than one year."0 Because the statute makes the
imposition of the reduced sentence of one year or less discretionary
with the court, the conviction of first-offense possession is still con-
sidered a felony since the maximum penalty provided by the statute
is not less than one nor more than ten years in the state prison."
While the 1971 amendment had the effect of reducing the penalties
for marihuana violations, it eliminated any differentiation between
sale and simple possession where the quantity exceeds 25 grams.
It should be noted that under both the Narcotic Act and the
Drug Act, simple possession requires no intent and is, therefore, a
"strict liability" offense. This absence of requisite proof of mens rea
for conviction of a felony raises questions beyond the scope of this
article and will be left for further inquiry.' 3 The only misdemeanors
contained in the Narcotic Act or Drug Act are found in the "com-
mon nuisance" sections.'4 Each provides that any structure or con-
veyance involved in illegally using, keeping or selling drugs or nar-
cotics shall be deemed a common nuisance, and no person shall
8. INn. ANN. STAT. § 10-3538 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-24-1-20 (1971) (re-
pealed effective Oct. 1, 1973).
9. IND. ANN. STAT. §?35-3338 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE §?16-6-8-10 (1971).
10. Id.
11. This is analogous to the discretionary sentencing of a year or less for theft of prop-
erty of a value of less than $10.00 under the Theft Act. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3039(1)
(Cur. Supp. 1973). INn. COnE § 35-17-5-12 (1971). Regardless of the sentence imposed, it is
a fclony conviction because of the maximum penalty provided by the Indiana legislature.
12. In 1973, the legislature, as will be discussed infra, radically changed the law in
Indiana with respect to offenses committed after October 1, 1973.
13. See Brady. Strict Liability Offenses: A Justification, 8 CaM. L. BULL. 217 (1972).
14. See INn. ANN. STAT. § 10-3531 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-24-1-13 (1971).
(repealed effective Oct. 1, 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-3340 (Cum. Supp. 1973), INn, CODE
§ 16-6-8-7 (1971).
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keep, maintain or visit such structure or conveyance. The penalty
is a fine of from $25.00 to $100.00, and up to six months imprison-
ment. Only if the defendant is arrested with drugs or narcotics in
his possession in a structure or conveyance can he negotiate for a
misdemeanor conviction.
Both the Indiana Drug Act and Narcotic Act contain offenses
with respect to the possession or control, with the intent to violate
any of the provisions of the Act, of any hypodermic needle or syringe
or any instrument adapted for the use of drugs or narcotics by injec-
tion. These are commonly called paraphernalia offenses. Strangely,
the offense carries possible imprisonment penalties of from 1 to 10
years and 2 to 15 years for first and subsequent offenses, respec-
tively, under the Drug Act, but only 1 to 5 years and 2 to 10 years
for first and subsequent offenses, respectively, under the Narcotic
Act. 5
The strict liability provisions of the Drug Act for simple posses-
sion, without a clear definition of a dangerous drug-which by tech-
nical definition includes any drug requiring a prescription-seems
unduly harsh. Since the statute can be read to require that the
prescription be solely for the possessor and the drug be in a labeled
container, one could imagine endless possibilities of violation.
Federal criminal laws pertaining to narcotics have been with us
since the turn of the century, beginning with the Harrison Act and
evolving through the Internal Revenue Codes of 1939 and 1954, and
the Narcotic Control Act of 1956. Initially, federal jurisdiction was
based either upon illegal importation or upon the imposition of a
tax.'" Illegal importation was prohibited as well as receipt, conceal-
ment or sale after importation. If unexplained possession was shown
at the trial, such was deemed to be sufficient evidence to authorize
conviction.' 7 Also prohibited was the purchase, sale, dispensing or
15. For the Drug Act proscriptions, see IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-3333(g) and (h) (Cum.
Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 16-6-8-3 (1971). For the penalties therefor, see IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-
3::38 (Cur. Supp. 197:3), IND. CODE § 16-6-8-10 (1971). For the Narcotic Act proscriptions,
SeC IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3520 (Cur. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-24-1-2 (1971) (repealed
etective Oct. 1, 1973). For the penalties therefor, see IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3538 (Cum. Supp.
1973), IND. CODE § 35-24-1-20 (1971) (repealed effective Oct. 1, 1973).
16. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 174 and 176 (1970) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, Oct. 27, 1970);
26 U.S.C. §§ 4704, 4705 and 4744 (1970) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, Oct. 27, 1970).
17. See Harris v. United States, 359 U.S. 19 (1959).
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distributing of narcotics, except in the original stamped packages
or in pursuance of a written order of the buyer, and the acquisition
of marihuana without having paid the proper tax. Again, proof of
possession created a presumption of guilt. Thus, while the Federal
statutes did not make possession a crime, the mere proof of posses-
sion was sufficient to sustain a conviction either for illegal importa-
tion or failure to pay the tax."8 But the Supreme Court of the United
States, in Leary v. United States,9 completely emasculated this
simplicity of prosecution. Stricken as a violation of due process was
the presumption of knowledge of illegal importation.20 Stricken as a
violation of the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment
was conviction for failure to comply with the tax provisions.2'
Obviously, Leary created a dilemma so far as federal enforce-
ment in the field was concerned. No prosecutions could be main-
tained for failure to pay the tax, and no longer could mere possession
justify a conviction where jurisdiction was based upon illegal impor-
tation. In enacting the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970,22 Congress threw traditional jurisdictional prob-
lems to the wind. Rather than rely upon its power over imports and
to levy taxes, Congress, in Title 11,23 the Controlled Substances Act,
made findings and declarations concerning health and general wel-
fare and the effect of drugs upon interstate commerce. It then pro-
ceeded to enact complete regulatory and criminal legislation.
Drugs and narcotics were lumped together under the label "con-
trolled substances" and placed into five separate schedules accord-
ing to their potential for abuse and physical dependence.25 Provision
was made for updating and republishing the schedules semi-
annually during the two-year period beginning one year after its
18. Id.
19. 395 L. S. 6 (1969).
201. Id. at 53.
21. Id. at 29.
22. Pub. I,. No. 91-513 (Oct. 27, 1970) (now codified in scattered sections of cts. 13-16,
21 U.S.C.).
23,. 21 U.S.C. §§ 8011-904 (1970).
24. The constitutionality of the Act under the commerce clause has been upheld by the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Lane, 461 F.2d 343 (1972) and by the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Scales, 464 F.2d 371 (1972) based upon the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), which dealt with loansharking.
25. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1970).
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effective date and annually thereafter.26 Power was delegated to the
United States Attorney General to make additions and deletions of
substances under certain conditions. 27
Conduct with regard to controlled substances was also classi-
fied under three prohibited categories of acts designated A, B and
C. Offenses and penalties are now determined by matching a pro-
hibited act with the schedule in which the controlled substance is
listed. The most severe penalties are provided for prohibited acts A
involving Schedules I and II controlled substances. Prohibited acts
B and C concern manufacturers, distributors and dispensers who
are required to keep a register and who fail to comply with the
regulatory provisions. Prohibited acts A are directed to everyone
else and are the subject of the majority of the criminal prosecutions.
These prohibited acts, found at 21 U.S.C. § 841, are defined simply
as knowingly or intentionally manufacturing, distributing or dis-
pensing a controlled substance or possessing such substance with
intent to distribute or dispense. There follows an intricate system
of punishment ranging from imprisonment of one year and a $5,000
fine28 to 15 years and a $25,000 fine,29 depending upon the schedule
in which the controlled substance is listed and upon whether the
drug is a narcotic or a non-narcotic. 30 Second and subsequent of-
fenders face double the maximum sentence if Schedule I, II or HI
substances are involved.3' Special parole terms ranging from 2 to 6
years must be added to any imposition of imprisonment depending
also upon the schedule involved." Anyone who is at least eighteen
years of age and who violates Section 841(a)(1) by distributing any
controlled substance to anyone under 21 years of age is subject to
double the maximum fine and imprisonment for a first offense and
treble punishment if he has a prior offense of the same nature.-
Attempts and conspiracies have the same maximum penalties as do
substantive violations. 34 The Act also provides even greater penal-
26. Id.
27. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (1970).
28. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1970).
29. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(A) (1970).
30. Schedule I of 21 U.S.C.A. § 812 (1970) contains both narcotic and non-narcotic
drugs without any clear definition as to which is which.
:31. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970).
32. Id.
33. 21 U.S.C. § 845 (1970).
34. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1970).
[Vol. 8
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ties of up to 25 years imprisonment if the defendant is charged with
being, and is found to be, a special drug offender as defined in 21
U.S.C. §§ 849-51. Any attempt to increase the sentence because of
prior convictions must be made by a filing of a separate information
prior to trial and a separate hearing thereon after conviction is also
required.3
To say the least, the Act is complicated, not only in determin-
ing the amount of punishment involved in a particular case, but also
in defining the illegality of conduct. One improvement over prior
federal legislation is a special provision for simple possession, i.e.,
possession without intent to dispense or distribute. Section 844 of
Title 21 provides for a maximum term of imprisonment of one year
and a fine of $5,000 for a first offense and 2 years and a fine of
$10,000 for a subsequent offense. This section (in the case of a first
offender) also provides for informal probation and the withholding
of judgment with a dismissal and discharge if probation is satisfac-
torily carried out. Such discharge and dismissal cannot be deemed
a conviction for any subsequent purposes and, if the defendant is
under the age of 21 at the time of the offense, the entire record may
be expunged."8
Section 841(b)(4) provides that anyone who distributes a small
amount of marihuana for no remuneration shall be treated as pro-
vided for in Section 844 (simple possession). The problem is that
nowhere does the Act define a "small" amount of marihuana.
The Act also contains numerous other provisions to help com-
bat the drug problem. "No knock" search warrants are authorized
by Section 879; forfeiture of property is provided for in Section 881;
and compulsory testimony with immunity is set forth in Section
844. Section 885 provides that no exemption or exception need be
negatived in pleading or proof and the burden is on the defendant
to establish such a defense. Section 886, it should be noted, author-
izes payment of money to informants.
Title III1 of the Act makes it unlawful to import controlled
substances into the United States. Again, the penalties depend
:5. 21 U.S.C. § 851 (1970). The reasoning in Lawrence v. State, - Ind. -, 286
N.E.2d 8:30 (1972), should require bifurcated trials in Indiana.
:36. Cf. notes 9 to I I supra and accompanying text.
37. 21 U.S.C. §§ 951-66 (1970).
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upon the prohibited acts, which are classified as A and B, and upon
the classification of the controlled substances in Title II. Generally,
there is a maximum penalty of 15 years and a $25,000 fine for impor-
tation of Schedule I or II narcotic drugs and a maximum penalty of
5 years and a $15,000 fine for the importation of a controlled sub-
stance which is not a narcotic drug in Schedule I or 11.3 Special
parole terms are also provided. Second and subsequent offenses are
subject to double the maximum for a first offense. 9 Attempts and
conspiracies are identically punishable2 °
Indiana Provisions Compared
In 1973 the General Assembly of the State of Indiana enacted
legislation completely changing and confusing the Drug and Nar-
cotic Laws in this state. Apparently awed by the wisdom of the
Federal Controlled Substance Act, the General Assembly did its
best to imitate it. In 1971, in addition to transferring marihuana
from the Narcotic Act to the Drug Act, the legislature had also
added to the Drug Act any drug appearing in Schedules I through
IV of the Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812. This had the
effect of including within the Indiana Drug Act everything which
was in the Narcotic Act and conduct with regard to any "narcotic
drug" could be prosecuted under either of the two acts. With the less
severe penalties set forth in the Drug Act, there was confusion as to
the penalty for sale or possession of a narcotic drug. It depended for
the most part upon how the prosecutor drafted the charges.
As noted, it seems that the 1973 legislation was a further at-
tempt to emulate the Federal Controlled Substance Act. First of all,
Public Law 144 amended the Drug Act by deleting from it all refer-
ences to marihuana, LSD and the drugs appearing on the four
schedules of the federal act.4 Secondly, the Indiana legislature en-
acted Public Law 335 which specifically repealed the 1935 Narcotic
Act and attempted to copy the Federal Controlled Substance Act.
Public Law 335 contains five schedules and criteria for scheduling
38. 21 U.S.C. § 960. See also note 30 supra and accompanying text.
39. 21 U.S.C. § 962 (1970).
40. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1970).
41. What remains in the Drug Act's definition of dangerous drugs are (1) those drugs
which require a prescription, (2) those whic , because of their toxicity or o er harmful effect,
are not safe to use except by a licensed practitioner, and (3) those which the Board of
Pharmacy may determine have qualities similar to dangerous drugs.
[Vol. 8
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which are, for the most part, identical to the Federal Act.42 Prohibi-
tive acts A, B and C are practically the same as those found in the
Federal Act. 3 Additionally, there is prohibited acts classification D
which is a recodification of the common nuisance section of the
Narcotic Act.4" Not found in the Federal Act, but contained in Pub-
lic Law 335, are provisions pertaining to paraphernalia intended to
be used to commit drug offenses. 5
Any similarity between the Indiana and the Federal Controlled
Substance Acts ends when it comes to the penalties prescribed.
Prohibited acts A, manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or deal-
ing, or possession with such intent of any Schedule I or II narcotic
drug, carries a maximum penalty of 15 years for a first offense and
30 years for a subsequent offense under the Federal Act,46 but under
the new Indiana Act carries a determinate sentence of not less than
5 years nor more than 20 years for a first offense and a determinate
sentence of not less than 20 years nor more than life for a subsequent
offense. 7 If the prohibited act A involves Schedule I or Schedule II
non-narcotics, or anything in Schedule III, the punishment under
the Federal Act is imprisonment for a maximum of 5 years for a first
offense and 10 years for a subsequent offense,4" but Indiana law pro-
vides the same determinate sentence of not less than 5 years nor
more than 20 years for a first offense, and not less than 20 years nor
more than life for subsequent offenses. 9 Thus, while the Federal Act
provides for a considerably lower penalty with respect to marihuana
and other non-narcotic drugs, as opposed to narcotic drugs, the
Indiana legislation makes no such distinction. Consequently, Public
Law 335 took an about-face from what the Indiana legislature had
promulgated in 1971, and as of October 1, 1973 the penalty for
distributing marihuana, or possession with such intent, is the same
42. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3559b-3559k (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE §§ 35-24.1-2-3
to 35-24.1-2-1 (1971).
43. Compare IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3561-3561b (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE §§ 35-
24.1-4-1 to 35-24.1-4-3 (1971) with 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-43 (1970).
44. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3561c (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4-3.5 (1971).
45. IND. ANN. SrAT. § 10-3561(c) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4-3.5 (1971).
46. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970).
47. IND. ANN. STAr. § 10-3561(a)(1)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4-2(1)(i)
(1971 ).
48. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970).
49. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3561(a)(1)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4-
2(1)(ii) (1971).
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as that for offenses relating to heroin."0
If a Schedule IV substance is involved, federal law calls for a
maximum sentence of 3 years,5' while Indiana law provides for a
minimum penalty of 2 years and a maximum of 10 years. Further,
the federal penalty for a Schedule V substance is a one year maxi-
mum, 53 while the Indiana Act provides for a minimum of one year
and a maximum of five years. 4 Simple possession without intent to
distribute any controlled substance is a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment for not more than one year under the Federal Act, 5
while the Indiana Act provides for a minimum determinate sentence
of two years and a maximum of ten years. 6
It is to be noted that the Indiana law retains the provisions for
a discretionary sentence of a determinate period not exceeding one
year for a first offender who possesses not more than 25 grams of
marihuana nor more than 5 grams of hashish. 7 Regardless of the
imposition of the discretionary lower sentence, however, the offense
constitutes a felony. 8 The 1973 legislation, however, increased the
penalty for simple possession of a non-narcotic, such as marihuana,
from an indeterminate one year to ten years, as had been provided
under the Drug Act, to a determinate sentence of not less than two
nor more than 10 years for any such offense committed after the
October 1, 1973 legislation. This legislation makes the maximum
penalty in Indiana ten times as great as that for the same offense
under the Federal Act.5 Both laws, however, provide that the judg-
ment of the court may be withheld and proceedings deferred for a
first offense of simple possession. The Indiana law requires a guilty
50. The constitutionality of such a provision is questionable. See People v. McCabe,
49 111.2d :38, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971).
51. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970).
52. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3561(a)(1)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4-
2) l)(iii) (1971).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970).
54. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3561(a)(1)(iv) (Cur. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4-
2(t)(iv) (1971).
55. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1970).
56, INn. ANN. STAT. § 10-3561(c) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4-3.5 (1971).
57. Id.
58, Sec note 11, supra, and accompanying text.
59. ('ompare IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3561(c) (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4-
3.5 (1971) with 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1970).
60. INn. ANN. STAT. § 10-3561g (Cur. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4-7 (1971); 21
I.S.C. § 844(h) (1970).
[Vol. 8
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plea for such disposition; under the Federal Act it may be utilized
after a trial and a finding of guilty.'
The propriety of Public Law 335 is questionable not only with
respect to its practicality, but also to its legality. If the federally
proscribed conduct was worthy of copying, the penalties should also
have been copied.
The 1974 Indiana Legislature has further increased certain pen-
alties effective April 1, 1974.2 The penalty for a first offense of
manufacturing, delivering or possession with such intent of a Sched-
ule I or II narcotic drug has been increased to a determinate sen-
tence of from 10 years to life, if the narcotic drug has an aggregate
weight of 10 grams or more, regardless of whether it is pure or
adulterated. The penalty for a first offense of simple possession of a
Schedule I or II narcotic drug has been increased to a determinate
sentence of not less than five nor more than 20 years if the aggregate
weight of the narcotics is 10 grams or more, regardless of whether
pure or adulterated. Ten grams is approximately one-third of an
ounce. Since the weight applies both to pure and adulterated nar-
cotic drugs, the penalties could be less with respect to pure heroin
than for that which has been diluted with quinine, manitol or sugar
and the weight thereby increased. Thus, eleven grams of heroin cut
to 3 percent would subject the offender to a more severe penalty
than would nine grams of 100 percent heroin.
THE DEFENSE
Important in the defense of any federal drug case is the 1966
Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act 3 dealing with drug addicted
individuals. Title I of the Act, now 28 U.S.C. §§ 2901-06, provides
for civil commitment before trial of persons charged with federal
crimes and dismissal of charges upon successful completion of treat-
ment. Title II, now 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-55, provides for similar com-
mitment in lieu of imprisonment for those convicted of a federal
crime. Title III, now 42 U.S.C. §§ 3411-26, provides for civil com-
mitment for persons not involved in the criminal process. In each
case, the court must determine whether the individual is an addict
61. Id.; see also note 3 supra and accompanying text.
62. See generally Pub. L. No. 152 (April 1, 1974).
63. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-06 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
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as defined and whether he is likely to be rehabilitated through treat-
ment. The first two Titles contain five provisions which exclude
from eligibility the following: (1) persons currently accused or con-
victed of a federal crime of violence; (2) persons accused or con-
victed of selling or importing narcotics unless for personal use by
reason of addiction; (3) persons against whom another felony charge
is either outstanding or who have not completed sentence or parole;
(4) persons with two or more prior felony convictions; and (5) per-
sons with three prior civil commitments under state or federal pro-
grams." The exclusion of those with prior felony convictions is not
a violation of due process or equal protection. 5
Direct, Controlled and Observed Sales: Police Methodology
In handling any drug or narcotic case, defense counsel must
first determine whether his or her client is charged with sale or
possession. Sale will be called distribution under federal law and
delivery under the new Indiana law. Equally important is the deter-
mination whether a drug or a narcotic is involved and what that
drug or narcotic actually is. If it is a sale or distribution case, the
determination should be made as to whether it is a direct sale, a
controlled sale or an observed sale. In a direct sale case, the defen-
dant has unwittingly sold to an undercover agent or to an informant.
A controlled sale is one where the informant is searched, found to
be carrying no drugs or narcotics, given money which is marked or
recorded, and sent to make a "buy" from a suspect. He is observed
as he approaches the suspect, deals with him and returns. He is then
searched again, and it is usually found that he is no longer in posses-
sion of the money, but is now in possession of drugs or narcotics. If
the actual transaction takes place in the presence of the agent, it is
an observed sale. If the authorities are not concerned about exposing
their informant, an immediate arrest of the suspect is then made.
If, however, that informant is necessary to make other cases, weeks
or months may elapse before the suspect is finally arrested. In these
cases, only the law enforcement agents testify; their testimony of
the close, uninterrupted observation of the informant in dealing
with the suspect, and returning, is consistently the same. The in-
formant is never called upon to testify, and his identity is seldom
64. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2901(g)(1)-(5) (Cum. Supp. 1973); 18 U.S.C. § 4251(f)(1)-(5) (1970).
(5. See Marshall v. United States, 42 U.S.L.W. 4121 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1974).
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revealed. In a direct sale case, naturally, the undercover agent or
informant must testify. Yet, often because his cover must remain
intact, arrests are not made until long after the transaction.
Familiarity with the methods employed by law enforcement
officials to apprehend narcotic violators is required for effective de-
fense work. Very few cases are made by surveilling a suspected seller
and waiting until he sells to an addict. Such an approach is tedious
and time consuming. Sellers, also, are by nature suspicious and will
not sell to a complete stranger. Thus, the use of informants in nar-
cotic and drug cases is probably more prevalent than in any other
area of law enforcement. Here, the informant not only supplies in-
formation, but assists in making cases and setting up dealers by
arranging for them to sell drugs to an undercover agent or to the
informant in the presence of an agent. He is often a user or minor
dealer himself so that his contacts and knowledge are valuable.
Usually, he has been arrested but is given a "break" if he can help
the authorities to make other cases. So long as he produces, he is
not prosecuted, or if prosecuted, his case is dismissed. Sometimes,
he is paid either in money or in drugs to support his habit. Often,
he is paid according to the number of cases he can make. He is,
therefore, motivated to manufacture cases. He will do anything to
make a case. On many occasions, he induces someone to obtain
drugs or narcotics for him by playing upon sympathies. This method
of inducement is not restricted, however, to the informant. It is
often undertaken by the law enforcement official himself who is
introduced to the subject by the informant. This results in a direct
sale case. Observed sales become direct sales when the informant
himself testifies to the transaction. Often, to concealthe role played
by the informant, what was actually an observed sale is testified to
as a direct sale by the officer once he appears in court.
Entrapment
In sale cases, whether direct, controlled or observed, the area
of entrapment must be explored. As noted by the Court in Sherman
v. United States,"6 entrapment is a defense "when the criminal de-
sign originates with the officials, and they implant in the mind of
an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense
66. :356 U.S. :369 (1958).
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and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute." 7 It
is not a defense when the defendant is ready, willing and able to
commit the offense and is merely afforded the opportunity. In this
respect, his predisposition to commit the instant offense is an issue.
Relevant prior conduct, whether resulting in convictions or not, is
admissible regardless of whether the defendant takes the stand. 8
Yet, that conduct must not be remote in time" and it has been held
error to instruct the jury that the defendant has to be "an innocent
person" before he can avail himself of the defense of entrapment. 0
Many law enforcement officials are of the opinion that they can
destroy any entrapment defense if they are able to make a second
"buy" from the defendant. This could possibly be correct if the buys
were separated in time and made by different undercover agents. It
should be remembered, however, that in Sherman, as well as in
many other cases where the entrapment defense prevailed, there
was more than one "buy." As stated in Sherman:
[It] makes no difference that the sales for which petitioner
was convicted occurred after a series of sales. They were not
independent acts subsequent to the inducement, but part
of a course of conduct which was the product of the induce-
ment."'
The issue of whether entrapment is a question of law for the
court, or one of fact for the jury, often arises. In each case, it depends
upon the evidence. The distinction can be seen in Sherman and in
Masciale v. United States,72 decided on the same day. In each case,
the question of entrapment was submitted to the jury with proper
instruction and in each case a conviction resulted which was af-
firmed by the appellate court. In Sherman, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the appellate court because the evidence
had established entrapment as a matter of law based upon undis-
puted testimony. In Masciale, the Court affirmed because conflict-
67. Id. at 372; see also Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932). Note should
Ie taken that the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the basic premises of Sherman and
Sorrells in United States v. Russell, 93 S.Ct. 1637 (1973).
68. 356 U.S. at 376.
69. Id.
70. Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
71. 356 U.S. at 374.
72. 356 U.S. 386 (1958).
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ing testimony had to be resolved by the jury. Thus, it has been said
that the factual issue of entrapment is a question for the jury, un-
less, as a matter of law, the defendant establishes beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that he was entrapped." Once the defense offers any
evidence to raise that issue, it is error not to submit the question to
the jury with proper instruction, i.e., the court cannot hold as a
matter of law that there is no entrapment.74 The defendant has the
burden of going forward with the defense of entrapment, but the
government has the burden in the entire case to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.75 Or, to put it another way, the defendant has
the burden of showing that he was induced to commit the offense
by the agent and the prosecution has the burden of showing that,
even so, the defendant was willing and ready to act without persua-
sion and was awaiting any opportunity to commit the offense."
Unfortunately, the only way to raise the defense of entrapment is
to plead not guilty and to go to trial. There is no way to raise the
issue by a plea in bar. However, it should be raised during trial
before the case is presented to the jury.
The defense of entrapment is roughly the same whether the
case is in federal or state court. Indiana follows the test set forth in
Sorrells v. United States" and Sherman.80 The major requirement
for the defense is that the criminal conduct must be the product of
the creative activity of the law enforcement officials or their agents.
As stated above, if the defendant has a predisposition to commit the
offense, affording him the opportunity will not thereby afford an
entrapment defense. Whether he was ready and willing is an issue
which must be resolved.8
7:3. Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1958).
74. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932); see also Pierce v. United
Slates. 414 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969).
75. United States v. Silva, 180 F. Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
76. Opinion of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.
1952). This opinion reversed Sherman's first conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
The second conviction was affirmed 240 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1952), but was reversed by the
Supreme Court :L56 U.S. 369 (1952).
77. 287 U.S. at 452.
78. Ervin v. State, Ind. App. -, 289 N.E.2d 131 (1972).
79. 287 U.S. 4:5 (1932).
80. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). For the Indiana decision illustrative of these two cases, see
Smith v. State. - Ind. . 281 N.E.2d 803 (1972).
81. See Reilt v. State, 256 Ind. 105, 267 N.E.2d 184 (1971) (purchases were induced by
an inl'ormant, but defendant's prior drug activity was clearly demonstrated).
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Smith v. State82 is an example of the schemes police officials
employ to entrap a defendant. While Smith had a predisposition to
engage in other unlawful conduct, he had none with respect to
drugs. Evidence of predisposition to commit the offense on the part
of the defendant is often, though unfortunately, couched in terms
of whether the law enforcement officials had probable cause for
suspicion.8 3 This, in at least one instance, has evolved into a holding
that reasonable suspicion alone is sufficient without probable cause;
in Childs v. United States84 the court supported this holding with
citations to Sorrells.85 In Sorrells, however, testimony as to the de-
fendant's general reputation for illegal conduct was insufficient to
show previous disposition. There must be evidence that the defen-
dant had engaged in the same type of conduct prior to the transac-
tion in question" before the defense of entrapment can be defeated.
The confusion in terminology stems from the failure to distinguish
between probable cause to warrant the law enforcement officials to
seek out the defendant in the first place, and the evidentiary re-
quirement on the part of the prosecution to overcome the defense
at trial. As stated in Smith v. State, the terms are "closely related
but yet somewhat different."87
Rarely will the defense of entrapment arise in a possession case,
unless the possession comes about in preparation for a sale which
has been induced and the prosecution elects to charge possession
rather than sale. In Gray v. State,8 8 the defendant was charged both
with possession and sale but convicted only of sale. There had been
no evidence of any prior activity with narcotics. Based solely on the
evidence that the sale was set in motion by the police, the conviction
was reversed because of entrapment. The court pointed out that had
the conviction been for possession, as in Spight v. State, 9 the en-
trapment defense would not have prevailed. The same result was
82. - I .nd_ -, 281 N.E.2d 803 (1972). See also United States v. Silva, 180 F. Supp.
557 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
83. Ser May v. State, -_Ind. - 289 N.E.2d 135 (1972); Walker v. State, 255 Ind.
65. 262 N.E.2d 641 (1970).
84. 267 F.2d 619 (1).C. Cir. 1958).
85. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
86. Id. at 441.
87. 281 N.E.2d at 805.
88. 249 Ind. 629, 231 N.E.2d 793 (1967).
89. 248 Ind. 286, 226 N.E.2d 895 (1967).
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reached in Stein v. United States,' where the defendant's posses-
sion existed before the government agents set the trap. Where the
possession with which the defendant is charged takes place only
after he is induced to sell, there is no reason to abandon the defense.
Of course, in basing a defense on entrapment, the defendant is
admitting that with which he is charged, but contending that he did
it only because he was illegally induced to do so by law enforcement
officials or their agents. It is in the nature of confession and avoid-
ance. The mere raising of the defense of entrapment itself aided the
court in affirming the conviction in Johnson v. State,9 where the
issue was the sufficiency of the evidence. It has been held, however,
that denial and entrapment are not inconsistent defenses and that
a defendant can deny the conduct and still say that if the jury
believes that it did occur, then the government's evidence as to how
it occurred indicates entrapment.92
Whether an entrapment defense can be made without the de-
fendant's taking the stand will depend upon the particular case and
how the evidence develops during the trial. In Sherman, the defen-
dant did not testify. The defense was sufficiently established as a
matter of law from the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. In-
deed, many reported cases uphold the defense solely upon prosecu-
tion evidence. If, however, in an observed or controlled sale case, the
undercover agent or the informant who made the "buy" does not
testify, there is no way to show the inducement except through the
defendant's testimony. In Henderson v. United States,3 entrap-
ment was found upon the basis of the defendant's testimony which
was not rebutted by the government. Thus, if the prosecution will
not allow its informant to be "smoked out," the only witness to the
induced transaction is the defendant himself. When the informant
engages in the transaction, whether he testifies or not, the defense
should be provided with information concerning his activities.',
There is another defense approach, ancillary to the entrapment
defense, when the transaction is between the defendant and an
90. 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1948).
91. 255 Ind. 589. 266 N.E.2d 57 (1971).
92. Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
93. 261 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1959).
94. United States v. Peterson, 170 F. Supp. 251 (D. Utah 1959).
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undercover agent or an informant acting on the agent's behalf. Un-
less the defendant is a seller who has a supply on hand, he is asked
to procure drugs for the informant or agent. In this situation, the
defendant is not a seller of drugs, but is merely obtaining drugs for
the buyer, i.e., an agent for the buyer acting on the buyer's behalf:
if the buyer provocateur acting for the government is not guilty of
an offense, neither is the defendant who is merely acting as a con-
duit. 5
It should, perhaps, be noted that where the entrapment defense
is not available because of a showing of predisposition on the part
of the defendant, its rationale often prevails to prevent a conviction
when the governmental conduct rises to a level of "creative activ-
ity" 6 and itself performs essential parts of the offense which might
not otherwise have been committed.9 7
It must be emphasized that for the entrapment defense to suc-
ceed, the inducement to commit the offense must come from law
enforcement officers or their agents. Entrapment is not available as
a defense when the inducement comes from a private individual,"
or from an individual who unwittingly leads an officer to a suspect99
and no inducement is made by the officer himself.
Search and Seizure
Sale cases do not require a search and seizure. Possession cases,
however, which ordinarily do not afford the defense of entrapment,
usually are the result of a search. The legality of that search must
be tested in light of the cases under the fourth and fourteenth
amendments. While Indiana's constitutional proscription 00 against
unreasonable searches and seizures is identical to that of the United
95. See Henderson v. United States, 261 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1958); Adams v. United
States, 220 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1954).
96. Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971); but see United States v.
HIssell. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). In Russell the Court reserved the question of conduct on the
part of' law enforcement officials alleged to have been "so outrageous that due process princi-
ples would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a convic-
tion .... " Id. at 431-32.
97. United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972). In the light of United
State' . Russell. however, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for further
consideration. United States v. McGrath, 412 US. 936 (1973).
98. 468 F.2d 10}27.
99. Thompson v. State, - Ind. -, 290 N.E.2d 724 (1972).
1(0. IN). CONST. art., 1, § 11.
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States Constitution, tactically the fourteenth amendment should
always be raised to preserve a federal question.'' In federal court,
an objection to the admission of illegally obtained evidence can be
waived unless a motion to suppress is filed before trial.1'0 If the
motion is overruled, objection to the evidence at trial should still be
made to preserve the record for appeal.'0 3 In Indiana, the legality of
a search and seizure may be raised for the first time by objection to
the evidence, but it is better practice to file a motion before the trial
commences.
1 04
The law of search and seizure is no different with respect to
narcotics offenses than it is in other areas of criminal activity and
will not be belabored. However, since we are dealing with possessory
crimes, automatic standing to object to the illegality is afforded.' 5
Probable cause is necessary to obtain a search warrant and probable
cause to arrest is necessary to justify a search incident to an arrest.
The fact that the object of the search is drugs is insufficient by itself
to excuse police from knocking and announcing their authority be-
fore executing a search warrant.'0
Often the defendant is arrested while in an automobile. Preston
v. United States'7 and Chimel v. California'"8 should be read to-
gether with Paxton v. State'"' for the requirement that the search
be contemporaneous with the arrest, be confined to the immediate
vicinity and be restricted to weapons within the defendant's reach.
Cooper v. California,"' which occasionally has been cited erro-
neously to get around Preston, probably now has some bearing be-
cause the Indiana Narcotics Act was amended in 1971 to provide for
seizure and forfeiture of automobiles."' There must, however, be
101. See California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 1068 (1972).
102. FED. R. CaM. P. 41.
10:3. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958).
104. A pre-trial motion is not required as a matter of law; the practice is one of tactics.
105. -Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
106. State v. l)usch, Ind. -, 289 N.E.2d 515 (1972). See also United States v.
Pratter. 465 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1972).
107. :176 U.S. 364 (1964).
108. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
109. 255 Ind. 264, 26:3 N.E.2d 636 (1970). See also Sayne v. State, __ Ind. __, 279
N.E.2d 196 (1972).
110. :386 U.S. 58 (1967).
III. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3553 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 35-24-4-1 (1971).
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probable cause to believe that the automobile is being used in the
perpetration of the crime. No traffic arrest can justify an "explora-
tory" search."'
Possession: A Legal Definition
Possession can either be actual or constructive; the latter de-
pending upon whether the particular defendant was exercising do-
minion or control over the substance in question and whether he had
knowledge of its presence."' Joint possession in a room can be in-
ferred when the drugs are in plain view of all the occupants." Visi-
tors in a home would not be in constructive possession of drugs
secreted therein unless there was other evidence showing their
connection with the drugs." 5 In Carrao v. State,"' marihuana found
in the trunk of a car was held to be possessed by the owner of the
car, who was a passenger in the front seat, and by the driver, but
not by the two passengers in the rear seat. Excluding the rear seat
passengers from any inference of knowledge is obvious. It is difficult
to accept, however, any concept that a driver of an automobile,
owned and occupied by another, is chargeable with knowledge of
anything contained in the locked trunk with no additional evidence
to show that knowledge.
In Bellamy v. State,"' the defendant stopped his car for his
companion to get out. As the companion exited the automobile,
police officers saw the defendant hand him an envelope and when
the companion was apprehended, the envelope was found to contain
heroin. The defendant was charged and convicted both with pos-
sessing and dispensing the heroin. At the trial, the companion testi-
fied that it was his heroin and that he had not received it from the
defendant. The conviction was affirmed as to both counts, however,
112. Sayne v. State, - Ind. __, 278 N.E.2d 196 (1972); Paxton v. State, 255 Ind.
264, 26: N.E.2d 636 (1970). It should be noted that this statement of law is substantially
unchanged despite the recent Supreme Court decisions in Robinson v. United States, 94 S.Ct.
467 (1973) and Gustafson v. Florida, 42 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1973) which authorized
searches in certain circumstances but failed to liberalize the permissible scope as defined in
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
11:. Greeley v. State, - Ind. App. -, 301 N.E.2d 850 (1973); United States v.
Jones. 3612 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
114. Thomas v. State, - Ind. , 291 N.E.2d 557 (1973).
115. Corrao v. State, - Ind. App. -, 290 N.E.2d 484 (1972).
116. Id.
117. - Ind. - ,286 N.E.2d 401 (1972).
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even though it seems perfectly natural for one to hand a departing
passenger an object about to be left behind.
While standing to challenge illegal searches and seizures in
possessory crimes is automatic with no need to show any possessory
interest," ' many instances will arise where the defendant is charged
with possession resulting from a search directed to another and
where the possibility of showing constructive possession seems re-
mote. Rather than take a chance, however, it is still tactically advis-
able to attack the legality of that search.
In Butler v. State,"9 it was held that the defendant, charged
with possession of heroin, had no standing to challenge the illegal
search of an automobile he did not own or possess; yet, the convic-
tion for possession of the heroin which was the product of the search
was affirmed. The facts disclosed that the conviction should have
been affirmed on the basis of actual possession and abandonment,
rather than upon the question of standing.
Abandoned property cannot give rise to a question of illegal
search because there is actually no search and any interest in the
property has been terminated. This has resulted in an influx of what
have come to be known as "dropsy" cases. The testimony of the
officers is that as they approached the defendant, they saw him
throw an object to the ground and walk away. Upon retrieving the
object, the officers find the package to contain narcotic drugs. This
testimony is generally accepted, with resulting convictions, even
though it seems incredible that so many defendants would drop
narcotics under the very noses of the police. The fact that the defen-
dant was seen to drop the narcotics has been held sufficient to show
that he had possession.' If, however, it can be shown that the
defendant threw the package away because he knew he was going
to be subjected to an illegal search, the package becomes the fruit
of that illegality. 121
Street searches cannot go beyond a pat down for weapons un-
less incident to a valid arrest. Any seizure of evidence beyond that
118. .)nes v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
I11). __ Ind. __, 289 N.E.2d 772 (1972).
120. Patterson v. State, 255 Ind. 22, 262 N.E.2d 520 (1970).
121. Bowles v. State. 256 Ind. 27, 267 N.E.2d 56(1971).
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is the product of an illegal search.' However, after a defendant is
in jail on a legitimate charge, anything found among his personal
effects is not the product of an illegal search. 2 3
Graham v. State' adopted the federal requirement that before
narcotic drugs can be admitted into evidence or testimony can be
received as to the laboratory findings, the prosecution must be able
to show an unbroken chain of custody by the police from the time
of the confiscation from the defendant to the presentation in the
courtroom. Because of the nature of the evidence, the prosecution
must successfully avoid any claim of tampering or substitution.
These standards have been relaxed recently in Butler v. State25 and
Cartwright v. State.'26 In Cartwright, the court's conclusion was
supported by a field test which is far from conclusive.1 7
Before anyone can be convicted of an offense involving narcot-
ics or drugs, there must be proof that narcotics or drugs were in-
volved. In Burk v. State,' 8 the defendant was convicted of the use
of narcotic drugs, to-wit: LSD. The conviction was reversed with
instructions to sustain a motion to quash because the Narcotic Act
did not include LSD within its definition of a narcotic drug. In
Healy v. State,'9 the defendant was convicted of possession of a
dangerous drug, to-wit: marihuana. At the time of the offense, mari-
huana had not been transferred from the Narcotic Act to the Drug
Act. Even though no motion to quash had been filed, the conviction
was reversed because of a failure of proof.
A very dangerous and unwarranted conclusion was reached in
Pryor v. State3 ° which upheld a conviction for selling a dangerous
drug. The affidavit did not appear in the opinion and, therefore, the
122. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 20 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United
States v. )el Toro, 464 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1972). But cf. Adams v. United States, 407 U.S.
14: (1972).
12:1. Ramirez v. State, - Ind. App. -, 286 N.E.2d 219 (1972); Farrie v. State, 255
Ind. 681, 266 N.E.2d 212 (1971). Contra, Brett v. United States, 412 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1969).
124. 253 Ind. 525 N.E.2d 652 (1970).
125. Ind. -, 289 N.E.2d 772 (1972).
126. Ind. App. -, 289 N.E.2d 763 (1972).
127. A field test will not, in and of itself, show heroin, but it will suggest a derivative
of opium. See D. BERNHEIM, DEFENSE OF NARCOTIC CASES § 4.02 (1973).
128. Ind. -, 275 N.E.2d 1 (1971).
129. Ind. App. , 288 N.E.2d 781 (1972).
1:M. (Ind. App. , 291 N.E.2d 370 (1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
-rounds. _ Ind. , 296 N.E.2d 125 (1973).
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specificity of the charge is unknown. A field test had been negative
as to marihuana and there was testimony that the substance in
question was dried ragweed. The court of appeals rejected the argu-
ment that there was a failure of proof. It cited the definition of
"sale" in the Drug Act"' as including an offer regardless of an ability
to complete the transaction and concluded that it did not matter
whether the material delivered was in fact a dangerous drug. It is
difficult to imagine how any conviction with respect to dangerous
drugs can be upheld in the absence of any dangerous drug, or that
the legislature intended such a result.
In Slettuet v. State, 3 1 the drugs were not put in evidence be-
cause none were found in the defendant's possession. The court held
that when the drugs themselves are not placed in evidence, there
must be expert testimony to show that a dangerous drug was in fact
involved. Since there was no expert testimony, the conviction was
reversed. This, apparently, is the first Indiana case even suggesting
the sufficiency of any evidence of the existence of drugs, other than
the drugs themselves, together with testimony as to their chemical
analysis.
Slettvet was followed by Pettit v. State.'3 There, again, the
narcotics were unavailable for evidence, but the addict to whom the
heroin was sold was allowed to testify as an expert that its effect was
the same as that of heroin. The conviction was affirmed because the
qualification of the witness was within the discretion of the trial
court.
In Pryor v. State,' 34 there was also a conviction on a count
charging possession of marihuana in addition to the sale count pre-
viously discussed. The marihuana was not in evidence. Citing
Pettit, the appellate court affirmed on the basis of the non-expert
testimony of others who were present at the pot party.
In a prosecution for possession of paraphernalia adapted for use
in injecting narcotics or drugs, there must be proof of intent unlaw-
fully to administer and use narcotic drugs. In Taylor v. State, 35 a
131. IND). ANN. STAT. § 35-3332 (Cum. Supp. 1973), IND. CODE § 16-6-8-2 (1971).
132. - Ind. 280 N.E.2d 806 (1971).
133. n__ Id. __. 281 N.E.2d 807 (1972).
134. n__ Id. App. -, 291 N.E.2d 370 (1972).
1:35. 256 Ind. 170, 267 N.E.2d 383 (1971).
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conviction was reversed because of the absence of such proof. The
requisite intent may be shown by needle marks on the arm,'34 to-
gether with withdrawal symptoms,'37 an attempt to conceal, and
narcotic history.1 8 Flight alone is insufficient.'39
With an emphasis being placed upon treatment and cure of
addiction, the use of narcotic drugs by physicians is being carefully
scrutinized by law enforcement authorities. Definite standards
must be maintained and a distinction is drawn between treatment
and maintenance. In Linder v. United States,'40 the Supreme Court
held that if a physician administers a drug in good faith based upon
his professional judgment, there can be no criminal offense. This is
a subjective, factual question which must be resolved in each case
and often conflicts with the objective treatment vis-a-vis mainte-
nance test used by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
CONCLUSION
Experience has shown that during the period when prescribed
penalties for drug offenses were increasing, there was no deterrent
effect because the incidence of drug use also continued to increase.
Recently, as noted, penalties have been lowered and restrictions on
suspended sentences eliminated. Indiana, however, has increased
the penalties as of October 1, 1973. It will be interesting to see the
result. Attempts to control drug use must be on a trial and error
basis. Lowering evidentiary standards and permitting illegal con-
duct on the part of law enforcement authorities are not desirable
solutions.
No one particular area of law enforcement can operate in isola-
tion. Dangerous precedents evolving from the fight against the drug
problem will remain to haunt us in all areas where individual liber-
ties are involved. While the concern of enforcement officers is under-
standable, they cannot be permitted to violate the law. As has been
aptly stated in two separate dissenting opinions in the same case:
1:M1. Irvin v. State, __ Ind. _ 282 N.E.2d 825 (1972); Dabner v. State, n__ d.
___ 279 N.E.2d 797 (1972); Stevens v. State, - Ind. __ , 275 N.E.2d 12 (1971).
1:37. Sargent v. State, __ Ind. App. -, 287 N.E.2d 795 (1972).
1:38. Eskridge v. State, __ Ind. __, 281 N.E.2d 490 (1972); Von Hauger v. State, 255
Ind. 666. 266 N.E.2d 197 (1971).
1:9. Bradley v. State - Ind. App. _ 287 N.E.2d 759 (1972).
1460. 2681U.S. 5 (1925).
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DRUG DEFENSE
[It] is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to
that end all available evidence should be used. It is also
desirable that the government should not itself foster and
pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the
evidence is to be obtained. . . . I think it a lesser evil that
some criminals should escape than that the government
should play an ignoble part.'4'
Our government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by
its example. . . . If the government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare
that in the administration of the criminal law the end justi-
fies the means-to declare that the government may com-
mit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against this
pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its
face. 142
These admonitions from the past are equally applicable today.
As pointed out by Justice Hunter in Slettvet v. State,"3
[We] take judicial notice of the frightening rise of illicit
drug use occurring in this country which is rapidly ap-
proaching epidemic proportions. However, we cannot allow
this fact to result in a lessening of the State's requirement
of proving each element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt for this requirement has long been a metaphysical
cornerstone of our criminal law."4
We of the legal profession are concerned and alarmed about the
drug problem today. We should be equally concerned and alarmed
about the erosion of our judicial process.
141. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
14:3. __ Ind. __, 280 N.E.2d 806 (1971).
1-14. Id. at __, 280 N.E.2d at 809.
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